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TAX TREATMENT OF TAKEOVER COSTS: SUPREME COURT
RESPONDS TO CONTROVERSY!
by
RAY A. KNIGHT & LEEG. KmIrr*
Recent developments in the tax treatment of takeover costs have caused
consternation among corporate taxpayers. According to the IRS, expenses
incurred in "friendly" mergers or acquisitions are not deductible, but are treated as
capital expenditures, or as constructive dividends to the shareholders of the
acquirer. On the other hand, expenditures incurred in the defense of "hostile"
takeovers are deductible. Because there is a difference in the tax treatment of these
costs, the lack of clear, concise criteria that can be used to differentiate a hostile
takeover from a friendly takeover is a significant tax issue. Taxpayers argue that
the criteria used by the IRS to differentiate the two are extremely subjective and
result in inconsistent rulings. The IRS's position with respect to hostile takeover
costs is set forth in Letter Rulings 89-27-005, 89-45-003, and 90-43-003. Further,
in National Starch and Chemical, deductions of takeover costs in a friendly
acquisition were denied by the Tax Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner' (formerly
known as National Starch and Chemical Corporation v. Commissioner) to decide
whether friendly takeover costs incurred are deductible as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses under Section 162(a). This article reviews the position of the
IRS along with the reasoning of the courts - including the Supreme Court's 1992
Indopco, Inc. decision - concerning the tax treatment of costs incurred in a
takeover.
Cut~mAT FOR TAKEovE Costs BEFORE INDOPCO
Normal Business Expenses
To qualify as deductible expenses, expenditures must be: (1) ordinary and
necessary, and (2) incurred in the carrying on of a trade or business. Thus, in
order for takeover expenses to qualify as an allowable deduction under I.R.C. §
162(a), the item must (1) be paid or incurred during the taxable year; (2) be
* Ray A. Knight is a professor of accounting at Middle Tennessee State University. He received a B.S.
degree in accounting from the University of Houston, an M.A. degree in accounting from the University of
Alabama, and a J.D. degree from Wake Forest University. He is a member of the American Intitute of
Certified Public Accountants, American Bar Association, American Taxation Association, and several
other professional organizations. Lee G. Knight is a professor of accounting at Middle Tennessee State
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1 Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. CL 1039 (1992).
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incurred in the carrying on of a trade or business; (3) be necessary; (4) be ordinary;
and (5) be a current-period cost rather than a capital expenditure.2
A "necessary" expenditure is one that is appropriate and helpful to the
development of the business. 3 In Commissioner v. Tellier,4 the Supreme Court
held that costs incurred to resist a hostile takeover that was not in the best interest
of the corporation and its shareholders were necessary because the costs
represented the directors' fulfillment of their fiduciary duties to act in the best
interests of the shareholders. In short, a necessary expense is a cost that is
essential to the continuing operations of the business. An ordinary expense need
not be recurring or routine. Rather, it should be a commonly accepted means of
defense against a hostile takeover. 5 In Northwest Industries v. B.F. Goodrich
Co.,6 the court held that hostile takeover defense costs were not capital
expenditures because management was acting in the best interest of the corporation
and its shareholders. A current-period cost is one that is incurred during the
current period and only benefits the operations of the current period. Conversely, a
capital expenditure is incurred during the current period but benefits the operations
of future periods as well as the current one. Ultimately, it may be expensed when
the business is disposed of or when the plan for the merger or acquisition is
abandoned. 7
If the cost does not qualify as a deductible expense, it is either classified as a
capital expenditure or as a constructive dividend. These two classifications relate to
costs incurred in a friendly merger or acquisition. Any expenditure related to a
change in capital structure is classified as a capital expenditure. According to §
263(a), no deduction is allowed for a capital structure expenditure because it
constitutes a permanent improvement made to increase the value of the business. 8
An expenditure incurred by a closely held corporation is considered a constructive
dividend if the IRS can show that the transactions related to the costs were of
personal interest or of advantage to the shareholders rather than for the benefit of
business activity. In American Properties v. Commissioner,9 the Tax Court held
that because payments made by a corporation on behalf of its shareholders were
made in furtherance of a private hobby, they constituted a constructive dividend.
2 Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
3 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
4 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
5 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-27-005 (March 27, 1989).
6 Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D.IIl. 1969).
7 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,352 (Dec. 31, 1984).
8 National Starch and Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner 93 TC 67 (1989), affd, National Starch and Chem.
Corp. v. Commissioner 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner 112 S. Ct. 1039
(1992).
9 American Properties v. Commissioner 28 T.C. 1100 (1957).
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TAKovER COSTS
Deduction of Costs in Hostile Takeovers
In Letter Ruling 89-27-005,10 the IRS held that costs incurred in fending off
a hostile takeover attempt are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. In so holding, the IRS rejected the district director's arguments that such
costs should be capitalized or treated as constructive dividends to the target's
shareholders.
In Letter Ruling 89-27-005, Y commenced a hostile takeover of X. X's
board of directors decided to resist the hostile takeover because it did not believe
that Y's acquisition of majority control of X would be in the best interests of all of
X's shareholders. X's board of directors was concerned that Y's large debt and
intercompany transaction practices would damage X's growth and financial
stability. Accordingly, X's board concluded that Y's takeover of X would be
detrimental to X's future business operations and to its minority shareholders.
X hired Z to defend against Y's hostile takeover. Z searched for possible
white knights and agreed to provide a fairness opinion letter to X's board. Z found
its white knight, W, which agreed to acquire all of X's stock in a taxable stock
purchase. X's board unanimously recommended acceptance of W's offer to X
shareholders. After X agreed to the acquisition by W, X and Y agreed in a mutual
release that Y would abandon its takeover attempt and would sell its shares to W at
the same price that W was offering to X's shareholders. X agreed to reimburse Y
for Y's expenses in seeking regulatory approval of its takeover of X. X's board
approved the settlement to avoid a proxy fight.
The IRS viewed X's anti-takeover costs as subject to three possible tax
treatments: (1) ordinary and necessary expenses deductible under I.R.C. § 162(a),
(2) capital expenditures, in whole or in part under § 263, or (3) constructive
distributions to X's shareholders. The IRS acknowledged that the costs were
incurred by X's directors in carrying out their fiduciary duties, and that the
directors' concerns were reasonable in light of Y's debt position, the failure of Y's
offer to cover all of X's shares, and the incompatibility of X's business with Y's
business. Thus, the IRS deemed anti-takeover costs to be ordinary and necessary
because X's directors had a fiduciary responsibility to oppose tender offers that
were detrimental to the company or its shareholders. The costs were "ordinary"
because they "were expended by X as the common and accepted means of defense
against attack from Y." They were "necessary" because "they were, in X's
judgment, appropriate and helpful to the corporation and its shareholders due to the
perceived harm which would result to the continued successful operation of X if
the tender offer of Y was allowed to be consummated." There was no indication
that the costs were excessive or unreasonable in light of prevailing business norms.
10 Priv. Lr. Rul. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989).
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Rather, the IRS concluded that they had been incurred to protect minority
shareholders and the future profitability of X. Management was acting in the best
interests of X and its shareholders.
Significance of Letter Ruling 89-27-005
On audit, the district director determined that, under an origin of the claim
analysis, the costs that X incurred in resisting the hostile tender offer should be
capitalized because the costs related to a change in X's capital structure and
represented the acquisition costs of the acquiring corporation. The National Office
of the IRS disagreed, however, concluding that the costs had not been incurred in
connection with an alteration or change in X's capital structure, but resulted from
the efforts of the board of directors to inform themselves about the takeover
attempt and protect the interests of the shareholders.
At the time of its release, Letter Ruling 89-27-005 was of interest because it
was thought to be at odds with a related ruling in Letter Ruling 87-41-00911 in
which the IRS barred a current deduction for the cost of investment banking
services and attorney's fees incurred in connection with the redemption of stock
held by a hostile shareholder group. In Letter Ruling 87-41-009, the IRS flatly
rejected the taxpayer's claim that because the costs were incurred in the exercise of
the directors' fiduciary obligations under state law, they were ordinary and
necessary. The IRS concluded that the directors' state law obligations were
irrelevant because the costs related to the acquisition of a capital asset and
corresponded to an alteration of the corporation's capital structure. On the other
hand, in Letter Ruling 89-27-005, the IRS found that the costs were ordinary, in
that they represented a common and accepted means of defending against a hostile
suitor, and necessary in that they were appropriate and helpful in avoiding the
hostile takeover. The IRS expressly rejected the idea that the costs were related to
changes in X corporation's capital structure.
Denial of Costs Incurred in Friendly Takeover
Although the IRS agreed to the deductibility of costs incurred in fighting a
hostile takeover, in National Starch and Chemical Corporation2 costs incurred in
a friendly takeover were treated differently. There, the Tax Court upheld an IRS
determination that investment banking expenditures made by the acquired
corporation were not deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. Instead, the
costs had to be capitalized as part of the cost of the recapitalization pursuant to the
acquisition.
" Priv. Lr. Rul. 87-41-009 (June 12, 1987).12 National Starch and Chem Corp., 93 T.C. 67.
[Vol. 9
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National Starch was a widely held corporation whose stock was traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. National Starch's largest shareholder, Mr. and
Mrs. Greenwall, owned approximately 14.5 percent of the company's outstanding
common shares. Mr. Greenwall was also chairman of the executive committee of
National Starch's board of directors.
The Unilever group expressed an interest in acquiring National Starch. Mr.
Greenwall stated that for estate tax planning reasons he would only transfer his
stock in a tax-free exchange that would be available to the other shareholders.
Unilever, Mr. Greenwall, and National Starch agreed to a plan under which
Unilever U.S. would create a subsidiary, Holding, and a transitory subsidiary of
Holding, NSC Merger. Holding would exchange one share of its non-voting
preferred stock for each share of National Starch common stock it received. Any
stock not transferred to Holding would be converted into cash in a merger of NSC
Merger into National Starch.
When the National Starch board of directors was informed of the proposed
acquisition, it retained an outside independent investment banking firm, Morgan
Stanley, to value the National Starch stock, issue a fairness opinion, and assist with
respect to any hostile takeover attempt. After some negotiation, the parties agreed
to a price, with Morgan Stanley providing a favorable fairness opinion with respect
to the price. The parties agreed that the acquisition was to be subject to a favorable
ruling on the transfer from the IRS. The IRS ruled that the stock-for-stock
exchanges would be tax-deferred exchanges under I.R.C. § 351 and that the stock-
for-cash exchanges would be treated as taxable sales.
Twenty-one percent of the National Starch shareholders opted for the
nontaxable exchange, and the remaining seventy-nine percent chose to receive
cash. After the merger was completed, National Starch's certificate of
incorporation was amended to eliminate its previously authorized preferred shares
and to reduce its number of authorized shares to 1,000 common shares.
The Tax Court noted several justifications that the parties had given for the
acquisition. Morgan Stanley had concluded that National Starch's affiliation with
Unilever would create the opportunity for synergy. National Starch's annual report
had stated that the company would benefit from the Unilever group's enormous
resources. The court noted, however, that in reality National Starch's operations
showed little change as a result of the acquisition. The Unilever group made no
material changes in National Starch's operations, provided it with no significant
services, and declined to engage in intercompany transactions.
National Starch's transaction costs included approximately $2.2 million in
fees from Morgan Stanley, $500,000 in legal fees, and $150,962 in other costs. In
its tax return for the 1978 tax year, National Starch deducted the Morgan Stanley
1992]
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fee as an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162(a). It did not
deduct the other fees. The IRS challenged the deduction of the investment banking
fees, asserting that they were either a capital expenditure or a constructive
distribution to National Starch's shareholders.
In this case of first impression concerning the deductibility of costs incurred
in a friendly takeover, the Tax Court upheld the IRS's denial of the deduction. The
court stated the five requirements of a § 162(a) expense: The expenditure must be:
(1) necessary; (2) incurred in connection with carrying on a trade or business; (3)
ordinary; (4) a current-period cost, not a capital expenditure; and (5) paid or
incurred during the taxable year. The court found that only the last requirement
was clearly satisfied. Having determined that the fees constituted a capital
expenditure, the court never addressed the first three requirements.
In its analysis, the court gave its own reasons for holding that the
expenditures were capital in nature. The court determined that National Starch's
board approved the transaction because it would be in National Starch's long-term
interest to shift ownership of the corporate stock to Unilever. The court based its
conclusion on three grounds. First, the directors' fiduciary duties required them to
approve the takeover only if it was in the best interests of National Starch and its
shareholders. Second, National Starch's annual report and Morgan Stanley's study
both stated that the corporation would benefit from inclusion in the Unilever group.
Third, the resources of the Unilever group provided both an immediate and a long -
term benefit to National Starch in the form of broadened opportunities.
Accordingly, because the expenditures incurred were incident to a shift in
ownership, they had to be capitalized under § 263.
IRS Redefines Its Inconsistent Position
The Tax Court's decision in National Starch provided the impetus for the
IRS to change its position in a private letter ruling that was issued after the
National Starch decision. In Letter Ruling 89-45-003,13 the IRS again addressed
the issue of whether costs are deductible when incurred by a corporation to resist a
takeover that, in the judgment of the board of directors, is not in the best interest of
the corporation or its shareholders. The IRS stated that the Tax Court's reasoning
in National Starch applies with equal force to a hostile takeover that is successfully
resisted by locating a white knight. The IRS found that there is "no less a long -
term benefit to the target of the hostile takeover as in the National Starch case."
Therefore, because the IRS found that Letter Ruling 89-27-005 was inconsistent
with the Tax Court's decision in National Starch, it revoked Letter Ruling 89-27 -
005.
3 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
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This is not the first time that the IRS has had trouble with the deductibility of
takeover costs. In Letter Ruling 85-16-002,14 citing United States v. Gilmore 15 and
Northwest Industries v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 16 the IRS applied the "origin of the
claim" doctrine in determining that the costs incurred by a corporation to oppose a
stock tender offer "were clearly incurred in carrying on a trade or business." The
IRS also stated, citing Welch v. Helvering,'7 Commissioner v. Heininger,8 and
Commissioner v. Tellier, 19 that the costs were ordinary and necessary costs. As a
result, the IRS allowed a deduction for costs incurred by the taxpayer in opposing a
stock tender offer. In General Counsel Memorandum 39,352, upon reviewing the
facts of Letter Ruling 85-16-002, the IRS chief counsel also agreed that costs
incurred in opposing a stock tender offer are deductible under I.R.C § 162.33
In Letter Ruling 86-26-001,21 the IRS withdrew Letter Ruling 85-16-002,
stating that it was reconsidering the area in connection with other costs incurred to
resist a hostile takeover - namely, "greenmail" payments. The IRS defined
"greenmail" as payments made by a target to a raider as well as payments made as
a result of a "stand-still" agreement under which the raider agrees to refrain, for a
specified time, from further attempts to acquire the target's stock.
In withdrawing Letter Ruling 85-16-002, the IRS also stated some general
rules regarding the corporation's repurchase of its own shares. Apparently, the
IRS considered the amounts expended by a corporation in repurchasing its stock to
be similar to amounts expended in fighting off a takeover. In Letter Ruling 88-16-
005, however, the IRS stated that "after careful and extensive reconsideration," it
was reinstating Letter Ruling 85-16-002.22
Reason for Supreme Court
To Grant Certiorari and Review Issue
In a November 1990 ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision in National Starch. The decision, which
dismayed takeover specialists, accountants and lawyers, had important
implications affecting the complex issue of what costs companies may deduct in
takeover battles. Accountants feel that it is difficult to draw the line between the
14 Priv. Litr. Rul. 85-16-002 (Dec.14, 1984).
15 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
16 Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D.I11. 1969).
17 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
18 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
19 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
30 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,352 (Dec. 31, 1984).
2 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-26-001 (Aug. 23, 1985).22 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-16-005 (Feb. 13, 1987).
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costs of fighting a hostile bid and those of arranging for a friendly bidder to come
to the rescue.
In July 1990, in Private Letter Ruling 90-43-003,23 the IRS told an insurance
company - presumably Western States Life Insurance Company of Fargo, North
Dakota - that the company could deduct as ordinary business expenses all of its
costs related to fighting an unfriendly takeover bid. But the IRS also said that the
company could not deduct as current expenses the costs of arranging a friendly
merger.
Was this a distinction without a substantive difference? On the surface, it
would appear to make little sense to distinguish between hostile and friendly
takeovers in determining the deductibility of costs. Nevertheless, the position
forced tax practitioners to advise corporate taxpayers to wait for an unfriendly
suitor to make its move before seeking a white knight. Following this strategy, the
taxpayer was able to deduct the majority of its takeover-defense costs; only the
costs associated with seeking the white knight were not tax deductible.
SUPREME COURT SETILES CONTROVERSY
OVER FRIENDLY TAKEOVER CosTs
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner31
(formerly known as National Starch and Chemical Corporation v. Commissioner
in the Tax Court and Third Circuit) to decide whether certain professional expenses
incurred by a target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover are deductible
by that corporation as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under I.R.C. §
162(a). Most of the facts were stipulated. According to the facts, a "reverse
subsidiary cash merger" was devised to satisfy the concerns of the major
stockholders. Morgan Stanley charged National Starch a fee of $2,200,000, along
with $7586 for out-of-pocket expenses and $18,000 for legal fees, for evaluating
its shares, rendering a fairness opinion, and generally assisting in the event of a
hostile tender offer. In addition, National Starch's counsel charged National Starch
$490,000, along with $15,069 for out-of-pocket expenses. Other miscellaneous
expenses of $150,962 were incurred - including accounting, printing, proxy
solicitation, and SEC fees in connection with the transaction. After the IRS
disallowed the deductions and issued a notice of deficiency, National Starch sought
review by the Tax Court asserting the right to deduct both the investment banking
fees and expenses and the legal and miscellaneous expenses incurred. The
reasonableness or propriety of the expenses was never an issue.
23 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
24 Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
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In ruling that the expenditures were capital in nature and therefore not
deductible under § 162(a), the Tax Court based its decision primarily on the long-
term benefits accruing to National Starch from the Unilever Acquisition. The
Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision by finding that "both Unilever's
enormous resources and the possibility of synergy arising from the transaction
served the long-term betterment of National Starch." 25 National Starch argued that
because the disputed expenses did not "create or enhance. a separate and distinct
additional asset,"26 they could not be capitalized, and therefore were deductible
under § 162(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a perceived
conflict on the issue among the courts of appeals.
Deductions Versus Capital Expenditures
The familiar rule is that "an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative
grace and the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the
taxpayer. '27 The Court found that deductions are specifically enumerated in the
Internal Revenue Code and are exceptions to the norm of capitalization. 28
Nondeductible capital expenditures, by contrast, are not exhaustively
enumerated in the Code; rather than providing a "complete list of
nondeductible expenditures," Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S., at 358,
Section 263 serves as a general means of distinguishing capital
expenditures from current expenses. See Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co., 418 U.S., at 16. For these reasons, deductions are
strictly construed and allowed only "as there is a clear provision
therefor." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S., at 440;
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S., at 493.29
Test for Current Expenses
Relying on Lincoln Savings & Loan,30 National Starch went away from the
"ordinary" and "necessary" tests of I.R.C § 162 to a exclusive test for identifying
capital expenditures - a test in which "creation or enhancement of an asset" is a
prerequisite to capitalization, and deductibility under § 162 is the rule rather than
the exception. The Court held that this interpretation of Lincoln Savings & Loan
missed the mark.
25 National Starch and Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 432-33 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, Indopco,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
26 See Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
27 Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943). See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308
U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
2' Indopco, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 1043.
291 d
3o Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
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Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that a taxpayer's
expenditure that "serves to create or enhance ... a separate and
distinct" asset should be capitalized under Section 263. It by no
means follows, however, that only expenditures that create or
enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under
Section 263. We had no occasion in Lincoln Savings to consider
the tax treatment of expenditures that, unlike the additional
premiums at issue there, did not create or enhance a specific asset,
and thus the case cannot be read to preclude capitalization in other
circumstances. In short, Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a
separate and distinct asset well may be a sufficient but not a
necessary condition to classification as a capital expenditure. 31
Inquiry into Future Benefits
A taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure
is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax
treatment is as an immediate deduction or as a capital expenditure. M "The text of
the Code's capitalization provision, Section 263(a)(1), which refers to 'permanent
improvements or betterments,' itself envisions an inquiry into the duration and
extent of the benefits realized by the taxpayer." 3
In searching the records and findings of the lower courts, the Court found
enough significant benefits to conclude that National Starch had failed to prove that
the costs were deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses:
1. The company would benefit greatly from the availability of Unilever's
enormous resources, especially in the area of basic technology
("Progress Report").
2. National Starch management felt that some synergy may exist with
the Unilever organization given (1) the nature of the Unilever
chemical, paper, plastics, and packaging operations . . . and (2) the
strong consumer products orientation of Unilever.
3. National Starch received benefits from its transformation from a
publicly held, freestanding corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary
of Unilever - i.e., swapping approximately 3,500 shareholders for
one.
a. National Starch was no longer subject to substantial shareholder-
relations expenses which a publicly traded corporation incurs,
31 Indopco, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
3- See, e.g., United States v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972); Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
33 Indopco, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
[Vol. 9
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 9 [1992], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol9/iss1/1
TAKEOVER COSTS
including reporting and disclosure obligations, proxy battles, and
derivative suits.
b. The acquisition also allowed National Starch, in the interests of
administrative convenience and simplicity, to eliminate previously
authorized but unissued shares of preferred stock and to reduce the
total number of authorized shares of common stock from
8,000,000 to 1000.
The Court found that expenses incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate
structure for the benefit of future operations are not treated as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. 34 Courts more frequently have characterized an
expenditure as capital in nature because "the purpose for which the expenditure is
made has to do with the corporation's operations and betterment, sometimes with a
continuing capital asset, for the duration of its existence or for the indefinite future
or for a time somewhat longer than the current taxable year."3 5 In ruling that the
expenses were capital expenditures, the Court held the fact that the expenditures do
not create or enhance a separate and distinct additional asset is not controlling.
Impact oflndopco
The unanimous decision in Indopco may have broad ramifications beyond
the takeover context. The IRS may interpret the decision as justification for its
recent tightening of the standard a company must meet to deduct the cost of
fending off a hostile takeover. The combination of the Supreme Court decision
and more aggressive enforcement by the IRS could produce huge tax bills for
dozens of companies involved in transactions dating well back into the 1980's.
The Justice Department told the Court in its arguments that more than $500
million in potential tax liability was at stake in pending disputes over the
deductibility of merger and acquisition fees.
The Indopco decision could embolden the IRS to deny deductions for
expenditures on such things as factory repairs, employee training, environmental
cleanups and advertising. Corporate taxpayers should be concerned about the
decision's broad language and the heavy burden it places on taxpayers to prove
deductibility. The Court's ruling does not explicitly apply to other takeover related
fees - such as points on bank loans--the deductibility of which is governed by
separate rules. However, the decision could cause the IRS to get tougher on the
deduction of bank fees as well.
34 See, e.g., General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832
(1964); Farmers Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 861 (1962);
Boris Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 5-33 to 5-36
(5th ed. 1987).
35 General Bancshares Corp., 326 F.2d at 715. See also Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244,
246 (2d Cir. 1953).
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CONCLUSION
As has been shown, until recently, the deductibility of takeover costs was
not settled. Taxpayers were faced with criteria and reasoning of the IRS that were
of questionable logic. Understanding the IRS's previous positions and
inconsistencies as well as its current position may help ztax professionals
understand the Supreme Court's decision.
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